The Third Way: A Different View of the Middle East

Virtually any article, except for unusually long ones, necessarily narrows its focus and leaves out important aspects of the broad subject it is discussing. In facile, pseudo-intellectual attacks, those who disagree with such articles often point out what is not there, as if it is possible, in just a few pages, to consider the breadth and scope of any problem, much less one as complex as the Israel-Palestine conflict.

In the new edition of the London Review of Books, there is a pair of articles, however, which, when taken together, give a fairly rounded view of the situation as it stands now in Israel and the Palestinian Territories. Making them perhaps more valuable and credible, the article criticizing Israel is written by a Jewish former executive director of the American Jewish Congress, Henry Siegman; while the article criticizing the Palestinians is written by an American of Palestinian ancestry, Prof. Rashid Khalidi.

Khalidi continues a theme explored in his superb book, The Iron Cage:The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood. Palestinians are often portrayed, by themselves and others in very distorted ways. By pro-occupation zealots, they are depicted as far more powerful than they are, and powerful enough to constitute a substantial threat to Israel. That characterization is absurd on its face, and it is a measure of the hysteria this subject can generate that there is a significant, albeit minority, number of people who actually believe it. But they are also often portrayed by their own supporters, and even at times by themselves, as completely helpless actors who are pure victims and have no role in creating the situation they now find themselves in. Khalidi’s valuable self-criticism paints a more realistic picture.

In “Shared Irresponsibility,” Khalidi draws careful attention to the actions of both Fatah and Hamas in creating the split that exists now in the Palestinian political body and which finds its expression in a geographical split between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Khalidi writes, “Fatah and Hamas have been fighting for control of a Palestinian Authority that has no real authority. The behavior of both has been disgraceful…In the four decades since the founding of the PLO, there has never been such a gulf between two parts of the [Palestinian] national movement.” (more…)

Back in 2005, Jewish Voice for Peace took to the streets in San Francisco to protest the just-commencing Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. More than a few people were puzzled by this action; here was a Jewish peace group apparently echoing the stance of some of the most hard-line so-called “pro-Israel” groups who opposed Israel giving up any territory at all. What was going on?

Of course, JVP was never opposed to Israel withdrawing its soldiers and checkpoints and abandoning its settlements in Gaza. But doing the right thing in the wrong way can be just as bad, in some ways perhaps worse, than doing the wrong thing, and this was what we saw happening with the Gaza withdrawal. Sadly, this prediction has come true, leaving the Palestinians split between two governing bodies, leaving Gaza in ruin and chaos and leaving Israel with an increasingly hostile and dangerous territory on its western border.

The middle of June, 2007 will be remembered by many as the time which saw Hamas and Fatah engage in horrible atrocities against one another, further aggravating the awful situation in the Gaza Strip. While Hamas has now established full, though tenuous, control over the Strip, it remains to be seen whether it is possible for them (or anyone) to actually rein in the chaos and whether they can hold on to any semblance of authority under a tightening economic blockade and a general atmosphere of lawlessness.

How did this state of affairs come about? (more…)

On May 21 a Qassam rocket fired from Gaza killed a 35-year old Israeli woman in Sderot. No doubt, this will mean a further escalation in Israeli fire into the Gaza Strip, despite the fact that this seems unlikely to stop or deter the Qassam fire.

These events are exposing the yawning gulf of leadership on all sides. Israel, rudderless under Ehud Olmert, vacillates between a silent response to Qassam fire while maintaining the economic blockade that fuels misery and rage in Gaza, and military responses that are targeting areas far from where the rockets are being fired. Meanwhile, Olmert speaks vaguely of “political horizons” and the preconditions the Palestinians must meet before he would even engage in talks (preconditions such as forgoing the issues of the refugees, the Temple Mount and the 1967 borders).

But the leadership vacuum among the Palestinians has been demonstrated even more starkly. Commentators often used to say that it was crucial to strike a deal with Yasir Arafat because, like him or not, he was the only one that could possibly make a deal stick. Indeed, since his death what little organization there was to both the PLO and the Palestinian Authority has frayed or even shattered. This has been due in significant measure to the occupation, yes, but also to Fatah’s mismanagement and corruption, increasing sectarianism both within and between Palestinian factions and the submergence of government behind family and local affiliation in importance.

Ironically, it has been the fact that Israel has resumed its shelling of Gaza that has diminished the infighting there, something both the Hamas political leadership and PA President Mahmoud Abbas had tried and failed to do. Despite the Mecca Agreement brokered by Saudi Arabia in March, the Palestinian government has been anything but unified. (more…)

The much-awaited moment has come and the League of Arab States has reissued the 2002 Saudi Peace Plan with no changes or amendments.

It is important to understand what this initiative says and the great potential it has for putting the region on a course toward a sustainable peace. It is also important to understand what it is not — a take it or leave it offer with no room for negotiations.

In fact, it’s exactly what Israel has needed for decades–a firm opening offer and invitation to negotiations from the entire Arab world. It’s not only peace with the Palestinians. It’s peace with the entire Arab world that is being offered. And not just peace, but normal relations. This is offered in exchange for Israeli withdrawal from all territories it captured in 1967, the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital and an “agreed upon” resolution to the refugee issue, based on UN General Assembly Resolution 194.

This can’t be stressed enough–the economic, cultural, diplomatic, political and social ties that come with normal relations prevent war and create a peaceful environment that no treaty or agreement possibly can. Israel needs to jump at this offer to negotiate. The Arab states know that Israel would not accept their plan whole cloth. They know Israel’s stance is that they are unwilling to go back to the 1967 borders and are unwilling to take responsibility for the refugees. But if Israel is willing to come to the table with their points and negotiate with the Arabs, progress can be made. (more…)

The primary purpose of the Palestinian unity agreement this week was internal Palestinian unity. But Palestinian security also depends on the lifting of the economic blockade they have been under since the election of the Hamas government.

In the short term, this agreement is not going to change the stances of the main actors in that blockade, the US and Israel. In fact, it may well harden their stances. Israel has already made some allusions to this agreement “tainting” Mahmoud Abbas. In their view, the unity arrangement is to be seen as bringing Abbas under Hamas’ umbrella rather than modifying any of Hamas’ stances. That they’re well aware this is not the case is not likely to change the political posturing.

In the long term, however, there could be some impact. Saudi Arabia has obviously given the agreement its blessing. That will mean some Arab money coming into the Occupied Territories. Saudi Arabia also enjoys the added benefit of largely blocking increased Iranian influence among the Palestinians. Neither Fatah nor Hamas is particularly interested in Iranian help if they have any choice in the matter. Up until now, they didn’t. (more…)

The preliminary deal struck in Mecca this week for a Palestinian unity government was greeted with a good deal of fanfare and a lot of questions. First and foremost among those questions was whether the deal would be “acceptable” to Israel and the United States and be adequate to lift the economic blockade those two countries have imposed on the Palestinians since Hamas’ election last year.

As was the case with the Prisoners’ Agreement last year, the question misses the point.

The primary goal of the unity agreement was just that–to create Palestinian political unity and to end the horrible fighting that has marred the Gaza Strip (and to a much lesser degree, the West Bank) in recent weeks.

That’s not to suggest that the US-Israel reaction was not a significant factor, but it wasn’t the primary one.

Under this agreement, Hamas and Fatah will each have 12 representatives in the 25-person Palestinian cabinet. The 25th will be a bone of contention and could derail the agreement. (more…)